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Comments and Casenotes
Estoppel By Deed - Application Between
Tenants By The Entirety
Day v. Truitt'
Complainant filed a bill in equity against her divorced
husband, requesting an order requiring defendant to exe-
cute a quit claim deed to a tract of land previously held
by complainant and defendant by the entireties. In sub-
stance, the bill of complaint alleged that complainant and
defendant acquired the property on June 10, 1936 as
tenants by the entireties; and, by a deed containing cove-
nants of special warranty, seisen, right to convey, quiet
enjoyment and against encumbrances excepting a certain
mortgage, defendant during coverture conveyed the prop-
erty in question to complainant on August 27, 1938, which
deed was duly recorded. Complainant obtained a divorce
a vinculo matrimoni from defendant on November 24,
1942. Complainant filed a motion for summary judgment
and an affidavit in support thereof, setting forth substan-
tially the same facts alleged in the bill of complaint, and
defendant demurred to the bill of complaint. Com-
plainant contended that either Article 50, § 102 authorized
the direct conveyance of entirety property from one spouse
to the other without the device of a straw man convey-
ance, or that defendant was barred by the doctrine of
estoppel by deed from asserting an after-acquired title.
The latter contention was based on the premise that the
divorce terminated the tenancy by the entireties and
rendered complainant and defendant tenants in common.'
The Circuit Court of Prince George's County held that
Article 50, § 10 was not applicable to a conveyance by one
tenant by the entireties to the other during coverture;
but, that when the parties were divorced and thereupon
ICircuit Court, Prince George's Co., Equity No. B-6290, Book 82, Page
406 (1961).
'5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 50, § 10.
"A conveyance, release or sale may be made to or by two or more
persons acting jointly and one or more, but less than all, of these
persons acting either by himself or themselves or with other persons;
and a contract may be made between such parties."
This section is a part of the Uniform Interparty Agreement Act and will
be discussed infra, Part II.
I See Meyers v. Loan & Say. Ass'n., 139 Md. 607, 116 A. 453 (1922)
and 2 TIFFA.NY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 436, p. 235.
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became tenants in common, the doctrine of estoppel by
deed operated to bar defendant from denying the effect of
his deed to pass title to his interest in the former entirety
property. The Court relied primarily on the KightO case
which held that where a lease of real estate is made by a
person who has no present assignable interest therein, but
who acquires an assignable interest during the term, the
lease by the doctrine of estoppel inures to the benefit of
the lessee by operation of law. Judge Marbury stated:
"While it is true that the Court of Appeals of this
State has never sanctioned a direct conveyance be-
tween a husband and wife of property held by the
entireties during the period of coverture, there is no
reason to distinguish between the effect of such a con-
veyance after the dissolution of the marriage with
respect to a third party [Kight case] as against the
grantee in a deed from a husband to his wife [instant
case] ."5
I. ESTOPPEL By DEED
The doctrine of estoppel by deed or estoppel to assert
an after-acquired title, as it is sometimes referred to, should
not be confused with the doctrine of equitable estoppel
which is also referred to as estoppel in pais or estoppel by
misrepresentation. As to latter the Court of Appeals has
said:
"Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary
conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely pre-
cluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights
which may have otherwise existed, either of property,
of contract or of remedy, against another person who
has in good faith relied upon such conduct and has
Columbian Carbon Co. v. Kight, 207 -Md. 203, 114 A. 2d 28, 51 A.L.R. 2d
1232 (1955) noted in 16 Md. L. Rev. 73 (1956).
5Supra, n. 1, 410.6 A number of states have passed statutes in the area of estoppel by
deed, many of these merely indorporate the principals to be discussed in
this article, and others merely confuse an area which is already some-
what perplexing. Maryland passed a statute in this area on March 8,
1856, see MD. LAws (1856) Ch. 154, § 5 (since repealed). "All title to real
estate acquired by the grantor, subsequent to a conveyance purporting to
be in fee simple, shall inure to the grantee." After discussing the statutes
in the area, specifying objections to them and making several recommenda-
tions one writer has said: "When these changes are made, the statute could
not be regarded as objectionable. It might well be maintained, however,
that the statute is then unnecessary !" Swenson, Statutory Estoppel By
Deed, 1950 W.U.L.Q. 361, 378. In light of the fact that the Maryland
statute is no longer in effect and in view of the objections raised in the
article by Mr. Swenson, statutory estoppel by deed will not be considered in
this article.
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been led thereby to change his position for the worse,
and who on his part acquired some corresponding
right either of property, of contract or of remedy".7
In estoppel in pais judicial assistance must be sought8
since only an equity is created in the grantee and his
privies,9 whereas, in estoppel by deed the after-acquired
title inures to the grantee by operation of law. °
Originally, the doctrine of estoppel by deed was based
on the covenants of warranty running with the land;
thus, when the covenantor subsequently acquired title,
to prevent circuity of action, it inured to the grantee or
his privies." The Maryland Court of Appeals has recog-
nized the doctrine of estoppel by deed based on the cove-
nants of warranty as early as 1856.12 The modern doctrine
of estoppel by deed is no longer based on the covenants
of warranty but is based on the representation of the
grantor. The leading case in this area is Van Rensselaer
v. Kearney,13 in which the Supreme Court of the United
States said:
"[W]hatever may be the form or nature of the con-
veyance used to pass real property, if the grantor sets
forth on the face of the instrument, by way of recital
or averment, that he is seized or possessed of a par-
ticular estate in the premises, and which estate the
7 Fitch v. Double "U" Sales Corp., 212 Md. 324, 338, 129 A. 2d 93,
(1957). See also, 2 Walsh, Commentaries On The Law of Real Property
(1947) § 226, p. 524, where in reference to estoppel in pai8 is stated:
"That doctrine depends entirely on representations, express or im-
piled, that the deed purports to convey a fee or other definite estate
and that the grantor has such title, that the grantee has parted with
value or otherwise has changed his position relying on such repre-
sentations, and that justice demands that the grantor be estopped from
denying their truth."
8itch v. Double "U" Sales Corp., 212 Md. 324, 129 A. 2d 93 (1957);
Rodgers v. John, 131 Md. 455, 102 A. 549 (1917).
12 Walsh, Commentaries On The Law of Real Property (1947) § 226,
pp. 524, 525.
10 American Law of Property (1952) § 15.21, p. 847. "It is said that the
title vests by operation of law, or by inurement, as soon as it is acquired, by
the grantor, without the need of judicial assistance."
19 Am. Jur. 615, Estoppel, § 16:
"[A]t law covenants of warranty contained in a deed of conveyance
of land run with the land, and if the covenantor subsequently acquires
an outstanding paramount title, it inures by force of the covenant to
him who claims under the deed of the covenantor."
"Funk v. Newcomer, 10 Md. 301, 316 (1856). "[A] grantor is estopped
from denying the title of his grantee; a title acquired by the grantor,
after he has conveyed, by warranty, land to which he had no title,
inures to the grantee by estoj)jel." See also, MD. LAws (1956) Ch. 154,
§ 5.
"11 How. 297, 325, 13 L. Ed. 703 (1850).
1962]
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deed purports to convey; or, what is the same thing,
if the seizing or possession of a particular estate is
affirmed in the deed, either in express terms or by
necessary implication, the grantor and all persons in
privity with him shall be estopped from ever after-
wards denying that he was so seized and possessed at
the time he made the conveyance."
This view of estoppel by deed as based upon repre-
sentation is similar to, and is often said to be merely the
application of estoppel in pals;14 however, the cases ex-
press the rule as actually passing the title to the grantee, 5
and is therefore properly classified as estoppel by deed.
No Maryland Court of Appeals decision specifically adopt-
ing this position has been found, but dictum in Columbian
Carbon Co. v. Kight,16 supports the view. This expression
of the doctrine represents the weight of authority today
and only a few cases either directly or indirectly support
the view that a covenant of warranty is essential to estop
the grantor from asserting an after-acquired title. 7 With-
out the necessity of the covenants of warranty, it is evident
that the doctrine of estoppel by deed has application to
most conveyances.'
144 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) § 1235.
Walsh, op. cit. supra, n. 9. § 226, fn. 16, pp. 528, 529. Referring to the
representation line of cases:
"In many of these cases statements of the court seem to express
the rule that title passes to the grantee and the privies of the grantor
are also bound, but they emphasize the equity involved to prevent a
fraud on the grantee, basing the decision on the false representation
of the grantor, which is nothing more or less than equitable estoppel
tr estoppel in pais. These statements may well be construed as
referring to a transfer of equitable title to the grantee and the privies
of the grantor may well be construed as not including a subsequent
innocent purchaser. Only in this way can these decisions make
sense."
1207 Md. 203, 210, 114 A. 2d 28, 51 A.L.R. 2d 1232 (1955) noted
in 16 Md. L. Rev. 73 (1956). "The grantor who executes a deed pur-
porting to convey land to which he has no title at all or to which he
has 'a defective title at the time of conveyance will not be permitted,
when he afterwards acquires a good title to the land, to claim in opposition
to his deed. This principle Is based upon the ancient doctrine that such
a deed operates upon the after-acquired title by way of estoppel. It has
been stated that the title vests by operation of law as by inurement as
soon as it is acquired by the grantor, without the need of judicial aid, in
order to prevent circuity of action."
1719 Am. Jur. 617, Estoppel, § 18; 58 A.L.R. 345, 380 (1929) ; 144 A.L.R.
554 (1943).
1 8E.g., see 3 American Law of Property (1952) § 15.19, p. 844 where in
reference to the doctrine under the representation view, it was said:
"By virtue of this doctrine, though a quit claim deed will not ordinarily
estop a grantor from asserting a later-acquired title or interest, it
will have that effect by virtue of the statute or without a statute
when the deed shows an intent that it should cover the interest subse-
quently acquired."
220
DAY v. TRUITT
It should be noted that under either view, the doc-
trine of estoppel by deed is applicable in two situations:
first, where the grantor has no interest in the property at
the time of the deed but subsequently acquires title; and,
secondly, where the grantor has an inalienable interest
in the land at the time of the conveyance which later be-
comes alienable. 9 The Maryland Court of Appeals has
applied the doctrine as based on the covenants of warranty
to both situations. In Poultney v. Emerson,0 applying the
doctrine to a lease where the lessor had no interest at the
time lease was executed the court said:
"It is a well-recognized rule that if a lease is made
by one who has no present interest in the demised
property, but acquires an interest during the term, the
lease will operate upon his estate as if vested at the
time of its execution."
Columbian Carbon Co. v. Kight,2" as quoted by the Court
in the instant case, discussed the situation where the grantor
has an inalienable interest at the time of the conveyance.
As previously indicated, the doctrine of estoppel by
deed is said to pass the after-acquired title to the grantee
or his privies, whereas, the doctrine of estoppel in pais
requires judicial assistance. The distinction between these
views is important in two situations: (1) where the dispute
is between a grantee who takes a conveyance before his
grantor has an interest in the property and a subsequent
bona fide purchaser from the common grantor, and (2)
where the grantee maintains an action against the grantor
upon the covenants of title.22
In the first situation, if we apply the doctrine of
estoppel by deed, the subsequent purchaser for value with-
out actual notice would lose, provided the prior deed had
been recorded.23  To remedy the obvious conflict be-
29 7 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (Perm. Ed.) § 3845, p. 310:
"Where a grantor who has no title, whose title is defective, or whose
estate is less than that which he assumes to pass, conveys by war-
ranty or covenants of like import and subsequently acquires the title
or estate which he purports to convey, or perfects his title, such after-
acquired or perfected title will inure to the grantee, or to his benefit,
by way of estoppel."
-117 Md. 655, 658, 84 A. 53 (1912).
207 Md. 203, 114 A. 2d 28, 51 A.L.R. 2d 1232 (1955) noted In 16 Md.
L. Rev. 73 (1956).
22 Walsh, Oommentaries On The Law of Real Property (1947) § 226,
pp. 531-532 and 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1230, p. 64O.
233 American Law of Property (1952) § 15.22, pp. 849-50; 4 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 1234, pp. 652-653; 2 Waish, Commentaries
On The Law of Real Property (1947) § 226, pp. 529-530.
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tween the doctrine of estoppel by deed and the chain of
title theory of constructive notice, it is said that the
record of the prior conveyance does constitute construc-
tive notice to the subsequent grantee even though recorded
before the grantor became the owner.2" However, in the
opinion of the treatise writers this view imposes: "[o]n
every purchaser the very serious burden of searching the
records for conveyances made not only by his vendor, but
also by his vendor's predecessors in title, for an indefinite
time back of the date of his or their acquisition of title."25
If the doctrine of estoppel in pais is applied in this situa-
tion, the conflict with the recording system does not arise
as a subsequent purchaser for value without notice is pro-
tected.26 This result would leave the prior grantee to bring
suit for damages for breach of the covenants of title.2
As to the second situation, if we apply the doctrine of
estoppel by deed, the grantee would be compelled to take
the after-acquired estate.28 Thus, the grantee is denied the
right to exercise his right to recover damages for breach of
covenant and must take the after-acquired estate in par-
21American Law of Property, op. cit. supra, n. 23, § 15.22, fn. 3, pp.
849-850. See also, Walsh, op. cit. 8upra, n. 23, § 221, p. 511, where in
reference to this remedy he states:
"Courts so deciding have erred in two respects; first, in applying the
obsolete doctrine of estoppel by deed at law, which does not properly
apply at all to modern deeds, the courts holding in these cases that
the legal title actually vests in the first purchaser through estoppel
by deed, so that no title at all passes to the second purchaser, pre-
venting the 'application of the doctrine of purchaser for value without
notice, and secondly, in disregarding the fact that the first deed or
mortgage, though recorded, does not appear in the chain of title, since the
grantor or mortgagor was a stranger to the title when the prior
instrument was executed and recorded."
2 TIrANY, op. cit. supra, n. 23, § 1234, p. 653. See also, American Law
of Property, Zoo. cit. supra, n. 24.
21-See Walsh, op. cit. supra, n. 23, § 226, p. 525 where in reference to
estoppel in pais it is stated:
"This doctrine creates an equity only, not a transfer of the legal
title when the grantor subsequently acquires title to the property,
so that a subsequent purchaser of the legal title from the same
grantor for value and without notice takes free of the equity."
27,Bigelow, Estoppel (6th ed. 1913) 480.
"It is sufficient protection to one who has been so rash as to purchase
before the grantor has a title, that he may call upon his grantor to
make a further assurance upon acquiring title, or, if too late for this,
that he may maintain an action upon the covenants of his deed."
21 Walsh, op. cit. supra, n. 23, § 226, p. 530.
"The doctrine that the legal title actually passes to the grantee
logically results in preventing or reducing the recovery by the grantee
for breach of the covenants of title, and cases insisting on that doc-
trine so hold."
See also, Tiffany, op. cit. supra, n. 23, § 1230, p. 640 and American Law
of Property, op. cit. supra, n. 23, § 15.23, p. 851.
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tial or total satisfaction of his claim.29 Were the doctrine of
estoppel in pais applied in this situation, the grantee would
have an option of accepting the after-acquired estate or
of maintaining an action to recover damages for breach of
covenant.
30
II. DIRECT CONVEYANCE
The Court in the instant case concluded that the Uni-
form Interparty Agreement Act3 i was not applicable to a
conveyance by one tenant by the entireties to the other
during coverture. This Act has been adopted by only
four states.2  Complainant contended that this act
authorized a direct conveyance by one tenant by the en-
tireties to the other during coverture and she cited a
number of Pennsylvania cases so holding.33 However, the
Pennsylvania statute had been amended so as to contain a
special section making it applicable to a conveyance by
"either tenant by the entireties alone to the other without
the other joining in the deed. '3 4 Irrespective of the fact
that the Pennsylvania statute has an express provision, it
has been argued that the Maryland statute would support
such a construction.
5
Notwithstanding the fact that the Uniform Interparty
Agreement Act might not apply, the Court in the instant
case could have upheld the direct conveyance on the theory
2Ibid.
10 Walsh, op. cit. supra, n. 23, § 226, p. 530.
"The better considered cases hold that the grantor cannot bar or
reduce the grantee's recovery by setting up the grantee's title by
estoppel, since the estoppel arises for the benefit of the grantee in
order to prevent the loss which otherwise would result from the
grantor's misrepresentation, not for the benefit of the author of the
fraud."
See also, American Law of Property, op. cit. supra, n. 23, § 15.23, pp. 851-
852 and Tiffany, op. cit. supra, n. 23, § 1230, p. 640.
a5 MD. CODE (1957) Article 50, § 10, supra, n. 2.
1927 - Nevada, N.R.S. 102.010-102.060; Pennsylvania, 69 P.S.
§§ 541-546; 1929 - Utah, U.C.A. 1953, 15-3-1 to 15-34; 1931 - Maryland,
5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 50, §§ 10-15.
See e.g., Tracy v. Tracy, 377 Pa. 420, 105 A. 2d 122 (1954).
69 P.S. § 541 (Perm. ed. 1931) as amended.
Meyerberg, Maryland Examines the Proposed Uniform Property Act,
4 Md. L. Rev. 1, 39 (1939).
"It should be observed that there is nothing in either the existing
Maryland Statute [referring to the Uniform Interparty Agreement
Act] or the proposed Section 1 [referring to the Uniform Property
Act] which affects any of the incidents of a tenancy by the entire-
ties, except that they render unncessary a resort Ito the fiction of a
straw man where the spouses jointly determine that one of them shall
enjoy the property in severalty."
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of a release.6 At common law a direct conveyance by one
tenant by the entireties to the other was void due to the
legal unity of husband and wife." However, since the
Married Women's Property Acts3" authorize interspousal
conveyances, it is generally held that one spouse can
transfer his interest in an estate held by the entirety to
the other spouse where the latter manifests her assent.3
It has been stated that "[d]espite the nonjoinder of the
wife as grantor, where she has manifested her assent to
the conveyance by accepting or recording the deed, or
by assuming to deal with the property as absolute owner,"40
the transfer is generally upheld. In Kenny v. Peregoy,4'
the Court of Appeals permitted a husband, via a separation
agreement and a deed executed pursuant thereto, to re-
lease to his wife his interest in land owned by the spouses
by the entireties. The latter decision and the result nor-
mally reached, since the passage of the Married Women's
Property Acts, in those states still retaining tenancies by
the entireties, would support the conclusion that the Court
could have upheld the direct conveyance on the theory of
a release.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court applied the doctrine of estoppel by deed,
however the same result could have been obtained without
resort to this doctrine which many treatise writers dislike.
The equity court under the doctrine of estoppel is pais
could have enforced the conveyance as an executory con-
tract, since it was made for a valuable consideration. Also,
the direct conveyance could have been permitted to pre-
vail, either on the basis of the Uniform Interparty Agree-
ment Act or on the theory of a release.
DONALD E. SHARPE
PowELL, REAL PROPERTY (1954) para. 623, p. 665.
"It is also generally possible today (contrary to 'the more rigid earlier
rule) for one tenant by the entireties to release his interest to the
other spouse without having both spouses join in the release." (Em-
phasis added.)
"26 Am. Jur. 858-859, Husband and Wife, § 253.
See e.g., 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 45, § 1.
"Powell, op. cit. supra, n. 35, para. 623, p. 665; 4 Thompson, Com-
mentaries On The Modern Law of Real Property (1961) § 1792, p. 107.
8 A.L.R. 2d 634, 635 (1949).
196 Md. 630, 78 A. 2d 173 (1951).
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